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"conservatism." From such institutional matters Mr. Kirk proceeds to subtler
aims: we must assure a professor that he is not a servant but "a learned man
invested with the dignity of a high profession"; we must invest our colleges and
universities with a sense of purpose, not a social purpose but rather "the
elevation of the reason of the human person for the human person's own sake
-the proposition that the higher imagination is better than the sensate
triumph-the proposition that the fear of God, not the mastery over man and
nature, is the object of learning." And so on, including "honor outweighs
success."
There is a sad lack of dignity in an Academy which stands resolutely upon
the refined isolation of "Bearers of the Word." Of course we. are fumbling
along as a community in trying to remove education from the preserve of a
small number of privileged people. Of course we have not seen clearly how to
work out the problem Plato set-how to define the different stages of education-to define what all must have in distinction from that appropriate to the
specially gifted. Of course our teaching of citizens must be rational and objective and passionate after Truth. But to find help in these matters we need less
contemptuous scolding like that of Mr. Kirk and more seriously constructive
thought. We need to know how guarantees of free thought as well as of sanctity of contract may help resist invasions of academic freedom. We need to
know how government can help support education while leaving it free t6 conduct its proper function. The heart of academic freedom is not isolation from
a "servile multitude." Rather, it is the ability to lead and develop the thinking
power of a free people.
DONALD MEIEJOiN*
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, College, University of Chicago.

The Law of Decedents' Estates, 2d ed. By Max Rheinstein. Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1955. Pp. xv, 875. $10.00.
Cases and Materials on Decedents' Estates and Trusts. By John Ritchie,
Neill H. Alford, Jr., and Richard W. Effland. Brooklyn: The Foundation
Press, 1955. Pp. xlvi, 1113. $10.00.
Modern probate law is tooled for the delicate handling of unusual situations. It is too complicated to be a satisfactory social instrument for the
handling of the ordinary estate. The complexities of probate administration
are primarily occasioned by the retention of old English requirements, the
social justification of which has long since vanished. Nowhere in the United
States today do the statutes contemplate a simple procedure for the administration of the estate of a man of moderate means. As a consequence the bond
salesman through the scheme of survivorship in co-tenancies, the insurance
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salesman with the third party beneficiary, and the retirement trust with its
future interest, are usurping the role of the probate lawyer in dealing with the
"common man."
With the post-depression increase in national wealth, the long-stagnant body
of probate law has begun to stir. The Model Probate Code, drafted at the instance of Professor Atkinson under the auspices of the American Bar Association, has apparently been abandoned on the doorstep. But at least eight
states in the past ten years have revised their probate codes, and further
action seems imminent. The law schools likewise are evincing a new interest
in the field. But both the code draftsmen and the law teachers and writers
are unfortunately attracted by the glamour of great fortunes and their energies seem directed more toward estate planning to avoid succession taxes than
to the simplification of administration of estates. Two new* casebooks, the
second edition of Professor Rheinstein's "The Law of Decedents' Estates"
and "Cases and Materials on Decedents' Estates and Trusts" by Professors
Ritchie, Alford, and Effland, illustrate the current trend and its noted weaknesses.
These casebooks are alike in that the authors decline to worship at the
shrine of Langdell. Rheinstein is particularly daring in making his own views
available to the students. The material in the work of Ritchie, Alford, and
Effland on descent and wills is also largely deliberative in form, and cases are
used principally as illustrating possible solutions.
This writer agrees that after a law student has learned the technique of
analyzing court opinions, the case method of study should be used only to a
limited extent in most courses. A case may be studied to determine the concepts basic to each general phase of the field of law. But most of the time of
student and instructor is better devoted to the more productive study and
discussion of the extensive text and law journal material available.
The approach taken by the two works is otherwise different. Of the various
methods of transmission of property, Rheinstein confines himself to a limited
discussion of intestate descent and to more extensive treatment of testamentary
disposition. He gives a substantial amount of time to the mechanics of administration of estates, a field that has been largely neglected by legal writers
since the time of Woerner. Ritchie, Alford, and Effland give most of their
attention to substantive law. Of the five fields of post mortem alienation, they
cover four: descent, wills, future interests, and trusts. Neither work attempts
to do more than wet its toes amid the breakers of survivorship in co-tenancies.
Professor Rheinstein's comments are, as befits a student of comparative
law, spiced with a trace of mysticism. His initial discussion deals with social
policy that has shaped the various rules of descent and the extent to which the
title holder has been permitted to divert property out of the stream of descent
through the medium of a will. A light touch is applied to historical develop-
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ment as an influencing factor. The details of descent (the practical differences
between the forced, the pretermitted, and the designated heir) are not accorded
minute attention. Passing to the formalities of execution of wills, the author
adopts a more earthy approach, and the student is invited to try his hand at
practical solutions of problems attendant upon draftsmanship. The author does
not, unfortunately, undertake to criticize the nonsensical formalities which the
statute of Victoria created, and which the legislatures and even the Model
Code have so slavishly followed.
The cases used are followed by collateral questions, the answers to which
are to be found in the cases cited. This tool is of service to the teacher who
assigns special projects, or in drafting examination questions. It benefits the
diligent student but ordinarily fails to excite more than a ripple of curiosity in
the sluggard. The cases employed are a pleasing selection of legal landmarks
with emphasis on the more modern opinions. Extensive reference is made to
leading law journal articles, and in a few instances short quotations are taken
therefrom. One would like to have seen somewhat more comment from Professor Rheinstein on the conflict of laws aspect of execution and revocation
and the question of the effective dates of such acts. As new probate codes are
adopted, the problems of the effective date of such legal changes are becoming
of increasing importance to the practitioner as well as to the student. The
author places more emphasis on undue influence, fraud and mistake than on
the role of mental capacity. The practitioner finds the reverse to be true.
It is in the consideration of treatment of dubious provisions of the will that
the author best displays his talents. Professor Rheinstein is an ardent advocate of the doctrine that the intent of the testator deserves something more
than lip service. To the delight of the jury and of the trial practitioner, he
urges that the court should first "interpret" the will to ascertain the testator's
intent, stepping into the testator's shoes amid the surroundings as they were
at the time the will was made. Only if this fails would the author permit the
will to be "construed" according to theories which have been developed
throughout the years by the courts as to the meaning the ordinary individual
would give to the testator's words. This method would give first rank to pure
rules of law where such rules operate to defeat the testator's intent. In the
second position would come collateral evidence, and finally "rules of construction." The chief objection to this philosophy is that it breeds nuisance litigation and darkens clouds on title. It will be viewed with horror by the executor,
the title examiner, and all those whose pole star is certainty of title. If, however, extension of the freedom of individual rights in testamentary acts is desired, the author's approach promises to come closer to ascertaining the intent
of the testator, if he ever had any intent as to the circumstance which arose.
Approximately one-third of the work is given to probate practice. It is surprising that this field has been so neglected by the teaching profession. It is

19551

BOOK REVIEWS

true that in the large city law factories to which law teachers are turning more
and more for guidance in moulding their curricula, probate, like bankruptcy,
practice has fallen into the hands of specialists. But there are many law
schools whose graduates, unlike those of more celebrated educational institutions, do not step into apprenticeships in large law firms. To these neophytes
who must depend on their law school training for their legal foundations,
grounding in probate procedure is as essential as the development of skills in
civil, criminal, and equity practice.
The author fails to point up sharply to the student that "assets of the
estate" is a fluid concept. Property may belong to the estate for purposes of
federal estate tax calculation, of state succession taxes, of the rights of surviving spouses, of payment of debts, and of distribution to beneficiaries. Some
property may be an "asset of the estate" though it did not belong to the
deceased at his death-i.e., if conveyed in fraud of creditors-and property
belonging to the testator at his death may not be an asset of the estate for any
purposes, as for instance, life estates or fees defeasible on death. Neither does
the author's casual treatment of liens entirely satisfy this writer. These minor
aberrations aside, Professor Rheinstein's discussion of probate procedure is the
only authoritative condensed discussion available to the student today.
Professor Rheinstein's philosophical approach to the law provides a unique
and ideal background for the student's understanding of the practical problems involved, and permits the instructor to devote his time to guiding class
discussion toward the strength and weakness of the law of the parent jurisdiction. Those who are not wedded to the case method will find it a most satisfactory pedagogical vehicle.
The combined work of Professors Ritchie, Alford, and Effland is, as the
authors state, prepared for a four hour course. It is so happily divided, however, that it can be separated into three distinct segments: Decedents' Estates,
Trusts, and Future Interests. Were the materials devoted to insurance and to
co-tenancies more complete, it might be said that the casebook is on the substantive law of estate planning.
The task which the authors have assigned to themselves is indeed a difficult
one. Powell alone in the writing field has set a similar goal. Its success presumes a thorough and unusual grounding of the student in the fundamentals
of property. Taken individually, the courses require a minimum of eight
hours of classroom instruction. Concentrating them into four hours creates a
dish so rich that digestion can be accomplished only by means of careful tutorial assistance to alert students devoting more than the usual amount of time to
pre-classroom study. Such concentration is required where law school curricula
are stuffed with courses dealing with remote corners of the ever-expanding
legal universe-sometimes to the neglect of fundamental subjects, the understanding of which is a sine qua non to the education of any specialist. Thus,
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while the necessity of such concentration as the authors accomplish is recognized, its practice, even with the skillful workmanship displayed, is to be
deplored.
The authors do, correctly, it seems, appreciate the similarity of the three
fields invaded by them and the duplication of effort which inevitably results
if they are separately treated. In their elimination of repetition in these areas,
they are wholly successful. The authors plan to supplement the course by a
two hour procedure course in Fiduciary Administration and a two hour office
practice course in Estate Planning. The total amount of time to be allotted,
therefore, is not far short, if at all, of that which this writer believes essential
in estate training-particularly if the principles of ownership are mastered in
the property course.
The opening material on descent takes the form of a well drawn discussion
of the historical development of the law and an outline of the legal jargon
employed.
The authors' treatment of wills deals with execution, revocation, and contests. It is concise, and the student and instructor are furnished with ample
reading suggestions which local statutes can supplement. Only in the segment
on interpretation and construction does the approach border on the perfunctory. The material on the testator's right to make a will under the title
"Grounds for Contest" is particularly well selected.
In trusts and future interests, greater reliance is had upon the case study
approach, with brief introductory remarks. One might wish that the style used
in the decedents' section had been followed more closely, and that the authors
had pointed out in more detail the conflicts among authorities and commented
thereon rather than relying on the Restatement as Holy Writ. The Restatement handling of controversial problems in property law has by no means
received universal acceptance. And its devotees tend too often to substitute
the role of missionary for that of teacher.
The cases presented for consideration as trust material are well selected,
and if class time is devoted principally to discussion of the problems involved
and to collateral materials rather than to the traditional case discussion, the
student will obtain an adequate foundation in the law of trusts.
Approximately two hundred pages are given to future interests. Here perhaps is the most controversial portion of the work. Anyone who has entered
the jungle either as instructor or student knows the extreme hardships and the
slow pace with which it is explored. Future interest problems are not encountered as trumpeting elephants, but as snakes lying beside the trail to sink
their fangs into the heels of the unwary. The study of future interests is one
to which the case method is ideally suited. It is not enough that the student be
told that there exist such things as defeasible fees, the rule in Wild's Case or
the rule on convenience in class gifts. He must be trained to discover for him-
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self where such problems arise in given sets of facts. The instructor, therefore, must presume that the student has had a thorough earlier grounding in
estates in land and their counterparts in personal property, and must devote
his time to fact analysis.
Accepting this presumption, the reader is presented with a well summarized
and highly concentrated analysis of mechanical types of future interests.
There follows light treatment of many of the standard problems in the future
interest field, examination of contingent and vested interests being omitted.
Interpolated in this matter is mention of the power of the court as a medium
of construction, reference to types of legacies, ademption, accession, accretion,
and exoneration, abatement, and increase. Although the comments of the
author are succinct, the space allotted is not sufficient to do more than acquaint the student with the nomenclature.
The work concludes with a chapter on fiduciary administration with cases
supplemented by a few comments pointing out some of the principal questions that face the trustee in the administration of the trust estate-an area
where statutory guidance is largely lacking, and a field again neglected by the
writers and teachers.
The comments expressed herein are critical of the pedagogical philosophy
that makes a task of this condensed nature necessary, not of the book itself.
The authors have performed a most difficult assignment in correlating materials with a minimum of irregularity in three fields that can be blended more
easily in the abstract than the concrete. Where curriculum difficulties require a
playing down of the property field, the work of Professors Ritchie, Alford, and
Effland gives a highly satisfactory, indeed, perhaps the only solution to the
problem.
JoHN S. GRmms*
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.

